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Lost Luggage: A Field Study of
Emotion-Antecedent Appraisal1
Klaus R. Scherer2 and Grazia Ceschi
University of Geneva
One hundred twelve airline passengers reporting their luggage lost to the
baggage retrieval service in a major international airport were interviewed after
their interaction with an airline agent. Participants were asked to rate their
emotional state before and after the interaction with the agent and to provide
information on how they had appraised the situation. The data are interpreted
with respect to (1) type and intensity of the emotions felt in this situation, (2)
appraisal theory predictions of emotion elicitation and differentiation, and (3)
emotional change in the course of the interaction following reappraisal of the
situation.
In recent years, the psychology of emotion has been strongly marked by
appraisal theories. In contrast to the classic assumption that prototypical
situations serve as antecedents of different emotions, these theories utilise
an individual's subjective appraisal of an antecedent situation to explain
the elicitation and differentiation of emotional responses (Arnold, 1960;
deRivera, 1977; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1968, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins,
1988; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988; Smith and
Ellsworth, 1985; Solomon, 1976; Weiner, 1982, 1986).
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acknowledge the contribution of Sabrina Scardua, Laurence Corthay Casot, Jaqueline Ritter,
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assistants in the study and of Leslie Kirby, Ursula Scherer, and Craig Smith who critically
reviewed the manuscript. Special thanks are due to Robert Rosenthal and Donald Rubin for
methodological advice.
2Address all correspondence to Klaus R. Scherer, Department of Psychology, University of
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While there is some convergence with respect to the nature of the
appraisal dimensions postulated by different theories (see Lazarus and
Smith, 1988; Manstead and Tetlock, 1989; Reisenzein and Hofmann, 1990;
1993; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1988), there are also some
differences (see detailed review in Scherer, 1997).
The major claim made by all appraisal theorists is that objectively simi-
lar situations or events can elicit, in different individuals, highly dissimilar
emotional reactions depending on idiosyncratic subjective appraisal. A
number of recent empirical studies have confirmed this suggestion and have
shown that a limited number of appraisal dimensions is sufficient to explain
emotional differentiation. These studies have used a variety of different
paradigms to establish the relationships between particular configurations
of appraisal results and the nature of the ensuing emotional reactions (see
also Ellsworth, 1991; Lazarus and Smith, 1988; Parkinson and Manstead,
1992; Scherer, 1988):
1. Asking for judgements of emotion labels with respect to the nature of
the appraisal implied by the underlying concepts (Conway and Bek-
erian, 1987; Frijda, 1987; Parkinson and Lea, 1991; Smolenaars and
Schutzelaars, 1986/87) This is a rather indirect approach, relying mainly
on the nature of the semantic fields of the emotion labels in a par-
ticular language. While providing interesting information on the social
representation of different emotions as stored in semantic concepts, it
does not directly address the issue of divergence of emotional reactions
given varying appraisals of a concrete situation.
2. Using vignettes or scenarios that have been systematically manipu-
lated with respect to appraisal relevant dimensions and asking sub-
jects to indicate the emotional reactions that they (or a fictitious
other) might experience in this situation (McGraw, 1987; Roseman,
1984; Russel and McAuley, 1986; Smith and Lazarus, 1993; Stipek,
Weiner, & Li, 1989; Weiner, Amirhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987;
Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman,
1979). This technique allows to present subjects with exactly the
same situational scenario and to consistently vary different aspects
of the situation. A potential drawback of this technique is the highly
mediated response—subjects have to imagine being in the situation
and responding to it. Thus subjects may use cultural stereotypes in
predicting their responses. While providing systematic information
that could not be obtained otherwise, this approach has relatively
low ecological validity in being too far removed from actual emo-
tional responses to experienced events.
3. Asking subjects to recall specific emotional experiences and ques-
tioning them about the outcome of antecedent evaluation processes
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(Ellsworth and Smith, 1988a,b; Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; Frijda,
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Gehm and Scherer, 1988; Mauro, Sato,
& Tucker, 1992; Reisenzein and Hofmann, 1993; Reisenzein and
Spielhofer, 1994; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Smith and
Ellsworth, 1985; Tesser, 1990). Since real emotion situations are to
be recalled and reported, ecological validity is not a major concern.
However, one drawback of this method, apart from the problem of
having to rely on long-term memory, is that each individual situation
is likely to be different and thus cannot be compared over individuals.
4. Making use of naturally occurring emotion-producing events (such
as examinations) or inducing emotions experimentally to obtain
judgements on appraisal processes (Folkman and Lazarus, 1985;
Smith, 1989; Smith and Ellsworth, 1987). This would seem to be
the method of choice given the requirements outlined above: Sub-
jects are studied in comparable situational contexts and thus differ-
ent emotional reactions can be traced back to individual differences
in appraisal processes. As is commonly known, the induction of re-
alistic emotions in the laboratory is exceedingly difficult, for both
ethical and practical reasons (see Wallbott & Scherer, 1989). In con-
sequence, the use of occasions in which many individuals are con-
fronted with comparable, naturally occurring emotion inducing
situations, constitutes a royal road for the investigation of emotion
antecedent appraisal. Studies by Folkman and Lazarus (1985) and
Smith and Ellsworth (1987) represent pioneering efforts in this di-
rection. In both of these studies university examinations were used
as eliciting events. This situation, which is highly comparable across
individuals, has the advantage of constituting a very significant event
in the life of the participants.
Following this line of research, the present paper reports a field study
of a common emotion-inducing situation with high ecological validity, af-
fecting a wide range of different individuals: Waiting in vain for one's lug-
gage in front of an empty conveyor belt in an airport arrival hall. We
assume that this situation is sufficiently comparable across many different
individuals to at least partly meet the requirements for an empirical test
of appraisal theories outlined above: The situation represents an objectively
similar, prototypical instance of losing property, at least temporarily.
Whereas prototypical situation explanations of emotion elicitation and dif-
ferentiation should postulate highly similar emotional reactions to this
event, appraisal theories would predict differential emotional reactions de-
pending on different profiles of subjective appraisal. Thus, this paper ex-
amines the variability of the emotional responses to the given situation and
the extent to which the specific reaction can be predicted on the basis of
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the dimensions or criteria of situation evaluation suggested by appraisal
theorists.
Specifically, the following questions were investigated:
Q1. With which intensity are a number of major emotions felt by airline
passengers in this situation, i.e. discovering that their baggage is lost?
Given the ubiquitous nature of this event, it is of interest to determine
empirically which emotions are more or less intensively felt by airline pas-
sengers afflicted by the disappearance of their luggage and whether these
affective reactions consist of relatively "pure" states or of "blends" of differ-
ent emotions (see Ellsworth, & Smith, 1988a,b)? This question is to empiri-
cally examine one of the fundamental tenets of appraisal theory: the notion
that objectively similar events or situations will elicit dissimilar patterns of
emotional reactions in different individuals, due to variable appraisal pat-
terns. The variable investigated in this context is the experiential component
of emotion, the individual's verbally reported subjective feeling state.
Q2. Can the emotional reactions reported by the airline passengers be
related to the limited number of appraisal dimensions as predicted by appraisal
theorists? What is the relative contribution of objective situation characteristics
as compared to subjective appraisal results to the explanation of the differential
reactions shown by different persons in the situation?
The present study is based the senior author's version of appraisal the-
ory. The component process theory proposed by Scherer (1984, 1986) con-
tains a model of the appraisal process in form of a hypothetical sequence
of "stimulus evaluation checks" (SECs) the results which are expected to
produce the different emotions. While a detailed description of the theo-
retical background cannot be provided in the present context (see Scherer,
1986,1988, for details), the major predictions of the model for the emotions
investigated in this paper, as based on a synthesis of published predictions,
are shown in Table I (adapted from Scherer, 1997). The appraisal-related
questions in the questionnaire used in this study were based on this theo-
retical framework. They will be used to examine to which extent the specific
emotion(s) reported by a participant can be predicted on the basis of these
variables. It is further examined whether objective situation characteristics,
such as the specific nature of the journey, affect feeling state over and
above the extent to which they are reflected in appraisal outcomes.
Q3. Does the initial emotional reaction upon discovery of the luggage loss
change in the course of the interaction with the agent in the baggage retrieval
office, possibly due to a reappraisal of the situation?
Most emotion theorists insist on the dynamic nature of emotion, as-
suming a process in which the nature of the emotional reaction is constantly
changing. Appraisal theorists assume that such changes can often be con-
ceived of as "reappraisals" of the situation or of one's ability to deal with
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the consequences of an event. The nature and regularity of such emotional
change following reappraisal has been rarely studied empirically. In the pre-
sent study, differences in the emotional states reported before and after
the interaction with the agent of the retrieval service are examined. In par-
ticular, it is asked whether the changes in emotional state can be predicted
on the basis of the evaluation of the retrieval service (which is likely to be
an important component of the appraisal of the situation with respect to
the probability of recovering the lost luggage).
METHOD
Participants
Participants in the study were 112 airline passengers who were unable
to retrieve their luggage in the baggage claim area of a major international
airport and having to claim it at the baggage retrieval office. Their behavior
during the interaction with the agents of the retrieval service was videotaped3
and their emotional reactions and appraisal of the event were assessed by
means of a structured interview.
3A camera was hidden behind the airline agent's desk in such a way as to allow to videotape
the full face and part of the upper body of the passenger in interaction with the claims agent
in charge of dealing with these cases. Two microphones, one for the passenger and one for
the agent, were attached under the desk and out of the passenger's sight. When the passenger
entered the office, one member of the research team directed the person to this special desk.
Upon leaving the office, every passenger was explicitly given the choice to have the tape
erased. All of the 112 passengers were willing to have the tape used for research purposes
and all except two answered all of the questions in the questionnaire, the two refusals being
due to time constraints of the passengers. These tapes have been analysed in the context of
a related study (Scherer & Ceschi, submitted) and are currently analyzed for further infor-
mation.
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Table I. Predictions of Appraisal Patterns for the Emotions Studied in This Research
Novelty/expectancy
Unexpectedness
Goal/need conduciveness
Goal obstructiveness
Coping potential
External causation
Coping ability
Compatibility with standards
Norm incompatibility
Anger
open
high
external
high
high
Resignation
open
high
open
low
open
Worry
high
high
external
very low
open
Good
Humor
open
very low
open
medium
open
Note. This table was adapted to the present context on the basis of earlier published predictions
(Scherer, 1984, 1986, 1988; see Scherer, 1997, for details on adaptation). Open = several
different results of the respective appraisal check are compatible with the emotion concerned.
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Table II. Participant Characteristics
Characteristic
Gender
Male
Female
Age in years
below 20
between 20-30
between 30–60
older than 60
Language group
French
English
German/Northern Europe
Asian
Other
Percentage
59.8
40.2
0.0
12.5
84.4
2.7
30.9
29.1
16.4
8.2
15.5
Personal background information for the participants in this study is
provided in Table II.
Agents
In negotiating field access, an agreement was reached that the identity
of the agents processing the claims of the participants would not be moni-
tored to ensure anonymity and confidentiality as well as to avoid evaluation
apprehension. For this reason, no information on the number, the gender,
the age of the agents, or the number of participants dealt with by each,
was retained. Approximately 12 airline employees, predominantly female,
participated as agents in the study.
Participant-Agent Interactions
Single airline passengers (not accompanied by others) arriving at the
baggage retrieval offce were directed to a specially prepared desk, allowing
for surreptitious recording of the interaction with the agent (for details of
the recording procedure, see footnote 3 and Scherer & Ceschi, submitted).
None of the participants was aware that his or her behavior was being
recorded. The agents working at this desk were informed about the record-
ing activity (and that they had to fill out a questionnaire after each inter-
action), but were unaware of the exact purpose of the study. They were
instructed to obtain the information necessary for processing the baggage
claim in their habitual manner.
The information gathering procedure generally consisted of the follow-
ing phases: (1) Greeting and obtaining information about the ticket and the
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final destination; (2) obtaining a description of the piece (s) of luggage and
their contents; (3) Ascertaining the forwarding address in case the luggage
was found; (4) handing the participant a copy of the retrieval forms and say-
ing good-bye. In general, these interactions lasted about 10 min, in a few
exceptional cases up to 20 min, and were conducted in French or English.
Participant Interviews
After the participants had left the desk, they were approached by a
member of the research team who explained to them that they had been
videotaped during the interaction with the airline agent and asked them
to take part in an interview.
The questionnaire used to conduct the interviews existed in four lan-
guages, French, English, German, and Italian. Four research assistants,
each speaking one or more of these languages, were present on site. In
each case, one of the assistants, able to speak the participant's preferred
language, read the questions and noted the answers in the questionnaire
by checking the appropriate answer alternatives or by categorizing open
responses into one of the predetermined alternatives (listed in parentheses
following each of the questions in the description below). The questions
tapped five major areas: nature of the travel; appraisal of the situation
created by the luggage loss; subjective feeling state; evaluation of the agent
and the retrieval services, and personal background. In the actual interview,
questions belonging to these five areas were posed in an order ensuring a
logical sequence of question content. Only the questions and procedures
pertinent to emotion-antecedent appraisal are reported here. Questions
and results relative to the social communication of the emotion elicited by
the luggage loss, based in particular on the analysis of the video records,
are reported elsewhere (Scherer & Ceschi, submitted).
Nature of travel was determined by asking about the purpose of the trip
(vacation vs. business) and its present stage (final destination vs. transit point).
Appraisal of the Event. In most studies of emotion-antecedent ap-
praisal, the assumed appraisal dimensions are assessed by direct question-
ing, i.e., requesting information on the novelty and pleasantness of an
event, its relation to the person's goals and the perceived power to deal
with the consequences. These direct questions may cause problems since
"normal" people may not be used to think in the categories underlying
appraisal dimensions. For example, Scherer has reported that participants
often have difficulties in identifying their goals, needs, or plans which are
affected by a particular event (Scherer, 1993, 1997). For instance, it often
occurs only to psychologists or biologists that survival can be construed as
a very basic "need" of any organism.
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In the present study, an attempt was made to use an indirect approach
to obtain self-report on appraisal. Rather than asking questions that are
directly concerned with appraisal dimensions, we asked for context-specific
information that can be assumed to contain the results of appraisal proc-
esses. The following dimensions, based on the series of emotion-antecedent
stimulus evaluation checks suggested by Scherer (1984,1988), were assessed
by such indirect questioning: novelty; goal importance; causal attribution;
coping ability; and compatibility with external standards.
The novelty check was assessed by referring to the participant's expec-
tancies concerning potential baggage loss: "When you first arrived at the
baggage belt, did it occur to you that your baggage might be lost or de-
layed?" (1 = yes; 2 = no).
The goal conduciveness check was operationalized as the interference
of the baggage loss with the participant's plans or goals. Two different ques-
tions were used: "How much does the fact that you have to wait for your
baggage to arrive interfere with your plans or activities today and tomor-
row?" (categories: 1 = it is a catastrophe, have to change plans; 2 = it is
a serious problem; 3 = a bit, but have enough time; 4 = no specific plans)
and "If your baggage is not found and returned within 24 hours, will you
suffer serious consequences with respect to your plans and activities?"
(categories: 1 = enormously, very grave consequences; 2 = perhaps, some
consequences envisaged; 3 = probably not, not important; 4 = not at all).
The mean of both answers constituted the goal conduciveness variable (the
variable was reversed and recoded to a 1-8 scale to have goal obstructive-
ness be represented by the high end of the scale).
The causal attribution check was also measured by means of two ques-
tions: "Who do you think is most responsible for what happened?" and
"Do you have any idea what might have caused the loss or delay of your
baggage?" The answers were recorded on the questionnaire and later re-
coded into 1-6 scale ranging from internal to external responsibility.
The assessment of perceived coping ability in this situation was par-
ticularly difficult, since it was felt that a direct question on control or power
might not yield appropriate information, given the nature of the situation
in which there is little possibility to intervene directly. The following ques-
tions were used to estimate perceived coping and adjustment ability in an
indirect fashion (as described above): "Have you yourself, or someone you
know well, had the experience of losing your baggage on a flight or having
to wait for it?" (yes/no). "If so, was the baggage eventually found and re-
turned?" (yes/no). "Do you think that it depends on the efforts or the ef-
ficiency of the baggage retrieval service whether your baggage is found, or
is that mostly due to chance?" (Service, Chance, Both). The underlying
assumption in creating a coping ability variable on the basis of these ques-
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tions was that the participants who had experience with losing baggage and
getting it back and who believed that the service might solve their problem
would evaluate their coping and adjustment ability as relatively high. In
consequence, the answers to these questions were combined to form a cop-
ing ability variable with, at one extreme, participants who never experienced
the loss of luggage or never got their baggage back, and, on the other ex-
treme are participants for whom losing and recuperating luggage is a well-
known phenomenon and who believe that the service can efficiently solve
their problem (the recoded, composite variable, ranging from 1 to 6, was
reversed to have high perceived coping ability represented by the higher
end of the scale).
For the compatibility with standards check, the degree of concordance
between the situation and external standards was assessed by the question:
"Do you think that most people regard it as quite normal and excusable
to have to wait for delayed baggage?"(categories: 1 = yes, most likely; 2
= probably; 3 = not at all, most people would find it abnormal). Thus the
higher end of the scale is interpreted as perceived norm violation or norm
incompatibility.
Clearly, this kind of indirect questioning requires more inferences and
makes more assumptions than direct questions on appraisal dimensions. In
that sense, it is less "clean" and there might be some disagreement about
the extent to which certain questions really index a particular appraisal
check. However, it was felt that these disadvantages of this procedure are
outweighed by its advantages, particularly that the questions are more
meaningful to the participants, and thus elicit more valid responses.
Subjective feeling state was measured for two different points in time, be-
fore and after having interacted with the agent. For each of these time points,
the participant was asked to rate his or her feeling state. The questions were
"How did you feel when you realized that your baggage would probably not
be delivered with that of the other passengers, before you went up to the
baggage retrieval office?" and "How do you feel now?", respectively. Partici-
pants were requested to answer these questions by rating their feeling state
on five emotion categories labelled as: Angry/Irritated; Resigned/Sad; Indif-
ferent; Worried/Stressed; In good humor (using 7-point scales labeled at the
extremes 0 = "not at all" and 6 = "very much"). Clearly, since both measures
were obtained after the actual interaction, they cannot be considered to be
independent. For the sake of economy, only the first term in the pairs above
will be used in most of the paper.
Evaluation of Agent and Service. The participant's evaluation of the
agent that served him or her as well as of the baggage retrieval service in
general were assessed by the following questions: "What is your impression
of the agent who served you?" (the responses were noted verbatim and
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Table III. Presence and Intensity of Emotional Experiences
Anger
Resignation
Indifference
Worry
Good Humor
Before Interaction with Agent
% Not felt
44.50
37.30
49.10
38.20
33.60
Mean
3.46
3.49
3.16
3.12
3.58
SD
1.77
1.61
1.64
1.82
1.72
After Interaction with Agent
% Not felt
62.70
52.70
47.30
52.70
21.80
Mean
3.29
3.33
2.97
2.77
3.90
SD
1.71
1.77
1.51
1.63
1.62
Note. % Not felt = percentage of participants reporting a scale value of 0 (zero) for the
emotion; mean and standard deviation (SD) computed for participants with scale values
greater than 0, i.e., those reporting to have felt the emotion to varying degrees.
later coded into the following three categories: 3 = positive, 2 = neutral,
1 = negative) and "Are you content with the help you have been getting
from this service?" (categories: 3 - very much, 2 = quite, 1 = not at all).
Personal Background. Information about nationality, age, and sex of
the participants was obtained at the end of the interview.
RESULTS
The presentation of the results is organized with respect to the ques-
tions enumerated in the introduction.
Type and Intensity of Emotions Felt. Table III provides information about
the participants' self-reported feeling states for the five emotion categories
before and after the interaction. For each point in time, the percentage of
those participants reporting not to have felt the emotion at all (scale value
0), as well as the mean and the standard deviation of the ratings of those
reporting to have felt the emotion to varying degrees are shown. The data
show that all emotion states are reported by a sizeable number of partici-
pants. Closer inspection of the data show a rather flat distribution over the
intensity values, which explains the high variance in intensity.
Since participants could check as many different emotions as they con-
sidered necessary, one can expect the occurrence of different emotion blends.
The data show indeed a massive amount of emotion mixtures or blends with
widely varying intensities of the different constituents. Given the wide vari-
ability of these blends, it is difficult to report these data in the form of simple
indices. Figure 1 shows the nature and frequency of the blends in graphical
form. In constructing the graph, cases were consecutively sorted (in the fol-
lowing order: anger, worry, resignation, indifference, good humor—from the
most negative to the most positive). The respective intensities of all 5 emo-
tions for all of the participants were then displayed using a cumulative area
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display. For example, if a participant had checked all 5 emotions with maxi-
mal intensity (6), the area column for that person would have reached the
maximal value of 30, with five parts of 6 units in length. This sorting resulted
in the ordering of the participants from low to high overall intensity and from
more positive emotion blends to ever more negative ones. The graph shows
that good humor or indifference virtually never occur by themselves, rather,
they are generally blended with at least one more negative emotion. The first
third of the graph (cases 1 to 31) shows clusters of either resignation or worry
with good humor added in. The importance of the good humor constituent
of the blend diminishes with the increasing importance of negative emotions
(to the right of the graph). In these cases, indifference seems to take the role
of good humor. One possibility is to conceive of these constituents of the
reported blends as regulation or emotional coping mechanisms used by the
participants to balance their negative affect with good humor or a "stiff upper
lip." As one might expect, there is a rather consistent worry constituent for
the large majority of the participants, irrespective of the nature of the blend.
About half of the participants show an anger constituent. As the latter be-
comes more intense, the good humor constituent is less pronounced. Overall,
the data shown in Figure 1 attest to the prevalence of emotional blends over
simple, or "pure," emotional states, at least in realistic, nonlaboratory settings
(cf. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a,b; Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1987). Figure 1 also
shows a tendency of overall intensity of the emotion blends to increase with
rising intensity of the anger constituent.
To simplify the analyses of emotional change over the course of the
interaction, it is desirable to create categories or clusters of participants
with comparable patterns of emotion blends. Both factor analyses and clus-
ter analyses of the emotion states were performed to determine potential
clusters. As one might expect, both analyses yielded two factors or clusters,
one for good humor and indifference, and the other for anger, resignation,
and worry. A cluster analysis across cases yielded a very large number of
clusters and the resulting categories were not suitable to perform further
analyses with a limited number of emotion blend classes. Therefore, based
on the results of these analyses and on the qualitative interpretation of
Figure 1, a classification of the blends into "dominant" emotional states
was performed. Firstly the categories of "indifferent" and "in good humor"
were combined (by computing the mean) to a new variable "good spirits,"
since it was felt that "in good humor," rather than being a positive emotion,
is indicative, like "indifferent, of the participant not feeling or not wanting
to admit an entirely negative emotion. Secondly, each participant was clas-
sified with respect to having reported either a dominant "pure" emotion
or one of three "emotion blends." "Pure" dominant emotions (angry/irri-
tated = anger; resigned/sad = resignation; worried/stress = worry; and
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good spirits) were assigned when the participant had reported one of the
emotion categories with an intensity of at least one scale-point higher than
all of the other emotions. One of the following three "blends" were as-
signed when the two constituent emotions were within two intensity scale-
points of each other and higher than all of the other emotions: anger/worry,
resignation/worry, anger/resignation.
The margins in Table IV show the distribution of the 110 participants
over these categories for the report of the feeling states before and after
the interaction with the agent.
Appraisal Predictions of Subjective Feeling States. One of the major aims
of this paper is to examine the degree to which the appraisal dimensions
obtained in the interview with the participants accounts for the nature of the
resulting emotional state and whether the observed patterns conform to the
appraisal theory predictions (see Table I). As in earlier studies in this research
tradition (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a,b; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989;
Gehm & Scherer, 1988), multiple regression analysis was used to determine
to what extent the emotional state reported can be accounted for by different
appraisal dimensions. Only the data for the ratings of the emotional state
before the interaction are used for the following analyses.
The results of full model analyses, including all predictors, can be
found in Table V, showing the regression parameters for the indidual com-
ponents of the emotion blends (i.e., the raw emotion ratings). The first row
for each emotion shows the regression of the appraisal dimensions de-
scribed in the Method section on the raw emotion ratings (ranging from
0 to 6). The results show that the goal conduciveness check is by far the
most important predictor, with perceived high obstructiveness of the loss
leading to anger and worry and low obstructiveness to indifference and
good humor. These results confirm the predictions for this dimension, ex-
cept in the case of resignation where the beta is in the right direction with-
out reaching significance. The only other effect that approaches significance
is also in accordance with predictions: anger is likely to be present and
more intense if the event is seen as incompatible with norms. A somewhat
elevated beta for high coping ability in the case of good humor is in the
direction of the predictions but does not reach significance. No effects are
found for the appraisal dimensions of unexpectedness, external causation,
and coping ability. Relatively strong R2s and high overall significance levels
for the complete equation are found for worry, anger, and good humor.
The appraisal predictors explain little of the variance for resignation and
indifference, the full model equations not reaching significance.
In an attempt to evaluate to what extent more objective variables that
were measured in this study might contribute to the prediction of the re-
sulting emotional state over and above the subjective appraisal, we entered
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type of travel (business vs. tourism) and final destination (the airport being
the final destination, generally "home", or not) into the regression models.
Only in one single case was a sizeable increase in R2 with a significant beta
weight observed: Anger being higher when the loss occurred en route
(yielding an R2 increase of .07). In all other cases, adding these variables
did not significantly improve the prediction.
The regression of the appraisal predictors on the raw emotion ratings
confounds two aspects of the issue: (a) whether a given participant said to
have experienced or not a specific emotion and (b) the intensity of this
experience. To study the respective contribution of the appraisal dimensions
to the prediction of these two different aspects, the raw ratings were de-
composed into two variables, a binary 0-1 variable indicating whether or
not the person had experienced the respective emotion, and a 1-6 intensity
variable for those participants who had experienced the respective emotion
(treating the cases with 0 as missing observations).
Logistic regressions were run for the binary variables. The results are
shown in the second rows (for each emotion) in Table V The third rows
show the results of linear regressions for the intensity variables (ranging
from 1-6). Again, full models were estimated. These analyses basically con-
firm the results of the linear regressions on the raw ratings. There is little
explanation of the variance for resignation and indifference but a reason-
able proportion of variance explained, yielding significant overall models,
for anger, worry and good humor. However, there are striking differences
between the logistic (on-off) and the linear (intensity) regressions for the
three emotions. Whereas the appraisal dimensions predict both the sheer
occurrence and the intensity of worry, for anger they mostly explain occur-
rence and for good humor mostly intensity. In other words, the appraisal
of the baggage loss situation as highly obstructive and incompatible with
norms produces the onset of anger, without predicting the intensity of this
feeling. Conversely, the presence or absence of good humor cannot be pre-
dicted by the appraisal dimensions whereas the intensity of good humor,
once elicited, seems to depend on low obstructiveness and perceived ex-
ternal causation of the event (probably also on high coping ability, although
the respective beta is not significant).
In the spirit of an exploratory analysis of the relationships between
the appraisal dimensions and the emotion ratings, a nonlinear canonical
correlation analysis (using Optimal Scaling by Alternating Least Squares,
via the OVERALS procedure in SPSS) of the raw emotion ratings (occur-
rence and intensity) was performed. The three dimensional solution is
shown in Figure 2. This way of plotting the data confirms the regression
results discussed above and suggests that some of the predicted patterns
that did not reach significance in those parametric analyses receive some
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tendential support by the proximity patterns. For example, as predicted (see
Table I), anger and good humor are closer to coping ability than the other
emotions and worry is closest to unexpectedness.
Change Following Reappraisal. It had been expected that the interaction
with the agent would tend to change the subjective feeling state. Table IV
shows the direction of the changes for the dominant emotion categories in
a sort of "affect migration matrix." The results show a complex pattern of
changes, three of which stand out in the table: (1) Participants who started
off in good spirits rarely lose them during the interaction. A sizeable
number of individuals develop good spirits during the course of the inter-
action, changing over from an initially negative emotion. These "mood im-
provers" mostly come from the resignation/worry blend category. (2)
Individuals reacting with pure or blended anger mostly remain within the
negative mood categories; they seem to be diffcult to placate in the inter-
action. (3) The ranks of the resignation/worry category are filled by par-
ticipants who before the interaction had indicated pure negative states or
anger blends.
While the data in Table IV reveal significant changes in the type of
emotion felt, they do not address the issue of intensity changes. Therefore,
the raw feeling states rating for the periods before and after the interaction
were correlated. The data are shown in Table VI. High correlations between
the same feeling states (r values in the diagonal) can be considered as in-
Fig. 2. Component loadings in a three-dimensional solution produced by nonlinear
canonical correlation of appraisal dimensions and emotion ratings.
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Table VI. Correlations of Raw Feeling State Ratings After the Interaction with the Corre-
sponding Ratings Before the Interaction and with the Rating of the Service
Raw feeling state rating
before the interaction
Anger
Resignation
Indifference
Worry
Good humor
Rating of service
Satisfaction with service
Impression of agent
Raw feeling state after interaction
Anger
.68"
.19*
-.22*
.39**
-.34**
-.25**
-.18
Resignation
.31**
.61**
-.07
.28**
-.25**
-.24*
-.06
Indifference
-.17
-.07
.72**
-.02
.19*
.07
-.06
Worry
.30**
.19
-.11
.58**
-.25**
-.16
.00
Good
humor
-.30**
-.14
.26**
-.24*
.75**
.10
.20*
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
dicative of the persistence of the intensity in a particular feeling state. Such
persistence is particularly high in the cases of good humor, indifference,
and anger. The off-diagonal r's give an indication of the probability that a
certain pre-interaction feeling state will affect the intensity of another type
of state after the interaction. While there are significant correlations within
both the positive and the negative emotion groups, showing some cross-
spreading, these are relatively low.
It was assumed that the changes in feeling state would be due to a
reappraisal of the situation due to the interaction. Such reappraisal should
be more pronounced for those individuals who declare themselves satisfied
by the service and who have a positive impression of the agent with whom
they interacted. The correlations between the post-interaction raw feeling
states and the evaluation of the service and the agent are shown in the
last two rows of Table VI. The significant negative correlations for post-
interaction anger and resignation with the satiefaction with the service show
that participants tended to be less angry and/or sad if they were satisfied
with the performance of the retrieval service. Post-interaction good spirits
correlate positively with a positive impression made by the agent. There
are no significant correlations with the feeling change scores (post- minus
pre-interaction ratings).
DISCUSSION
Type and Intensity of Emotional Reactions. The results show that the
situation of one's luggage being lost upon arrival in an airport reliably pro-
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duces emotional states amenable to empirical investigation. Participants in
the present study responded to the situation with complex emotional re-
actions that, for the purposes of verbal report, required the use of several
different emotion labels. While we had expected that many participants
would report to have experienced more than one type of emotion at the
same time in response to the eliciting situation, we were surprised by the
strong extent of emotion blending reported by the participants in this study
in response to what seemed a relatively prototypical situation. This is ad-
ditional evidence that emotional upsets in real-life settings seem consis-
tently to produce affect states which can be labeled only by using multiple
emotion terms (see Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986).
A conclusion to be drawn from this accumulating evidence is that
emotion psychologists need to develop more appropriate methods to study
and analyze emotional blends, particularly in the domain of appraisal the-
ory. While the research paradigms using recall or imagination of emotional
experiences via a single eliciting emotion term or constructed scenarios fo-
cus on relatively pure emotion states, the study of real-life events or ex-
perimental inductions are likely to elicit much more complexly blended
states that require special methods for measurement and analysis. One
might think of the development of more sophisticated, integrative scales
for the rating of blended emotions, focussing the respondents' attention on
the need to describe a blend rather than individual states. Similarly, the
analysis of such blends needs to be further refined. In this paper, we have
presented a sorted cumulative area graph as a first approximation to a more
adequate representation of emotion blends. What is still missing is an ap-
propriate classification technique that allows to identify salient clusters. The
approach used here, identifying dominant states or pair-blends on the basis
of decision rules, may not be the optimal solution to the problem.
Most importantly, the nature of emotion blends needs to be addressed
more seriously on a theoretical level. For example, a first reaction to Figure
1 is often to wonder why it is that, in very many cases, negative and more
positive emotions co-occur in a blend. One possible answer is that the more
positive emotions, in the present case indifference or good humor, have a
regulatory function in the blend. In other words, they could be consequent
to the elicitation of a purely negative emotion, trying to control or weaken
the intensity of the negative emotion or generating acceptable social dis-
plays, and yet be subjectively perceived by the person as coincident with
the original emotion. Obviously, one possibility is that participants in emo-
tion research reporting on their feelings with standard scales integrate over
fairly large periods of time, thus producing apparent blends that would not
occur if a more fine-grained temporal resolution was chosen (see Edwards,
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in preparation, for the importance of choosing precise time points for the
reporting of emotional processes).
Testing Appraisal Theory Predictions. With respect to the factors deter-
mining the emotional feeling state of the participants, the present data show
that the important determinants of emotion elicitation and differentiation
must be sought in the subjective evaluation of events. The most important
factor in determining the participants' emotional reaction to loss of baggage
is the subjectively evaluated importance of the loss in the context of the per-
tinent goals and plans at the moment. This result closely corresponds to ap-
praisal theory predictions concerning the role of the goal conduciveness of
an event in eliciting and differentiating an emotional reaction (Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984, 1988). The ob-
jective nature of the travel, particularly the case of the final destination of
the flight not being the city in which the airport is located, while explaining
some variance over and above the subjective appraisal, does not appreciably
add to the discrimination of the resulting emotions.
On the whole, both the major assumption of appraisal theory—similar
events eliciting differential emotions depending on the nature of subjective
appraisal—as well as some of the specific predictions are supported by the
present data (none of which contradicts the theoretical expectations). How-
ever, one could argue that the confirmation of the predictions is weak since
only the goal conduciveness and the norm compatibility dimensions signifi-
cantly contributed to the explanation of variance in the emotion ratings.
We want to argue for a different interpretation of these findings. So far,
appraisal theorists have implicitly assumed that all of the appraisal criteria
are equally important and that they are all equally variable in all situations.
These assumptions may be in need of revision. To begin with, the various
appraisal criteria or dimensions postulated by the different theorists may
be of differential importance, requiring specific weighting with respect to
emotion prediction (Scherer, 1997). Thus, the novelty or expectedness di-
mension seems much less decisive for the nature of the ensuing emotion
than goal conduciveness or coping potential. In addition to the appraisal
dimensions being of differential importance globally (across all situations),
this is even more true locally, i.e., for specific situations or contexts.
This is particularly true when the range or variability of the assess-
ments on a dimension are constrained by the context. For example, in the
situation studied here, luggage loss, it is difficult to attribute the causality
other than externally (except in the few cases where one might have
checked in much too late, or forgot to close the lid of the suitcase, etc.).
In consequence, causal attributions are unlikely to vary over participants,
consequently explaining little of the variance. The same is true for the cop-
ing ability dimension—it is difficult to see what one can do other than
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reporting the loss—again restraining the range of variation of the evalu-
ations on the criterion and thus accounting for little variance. Thus, one
should not consider the data of the present study as disappointing since
they do not show the full profiles that are theoretically expected. Rather,
they would seem to suggest that appraisal theorists need to start being con-
cerned with local constraints on the variability of appraisals and their po-
tential effects on emotion elicitation and differentiation.
Another major lesson emanating from the present data set is the im-
portance of differentiation between the occurrence or onset of an emotion
and its intensity. Until recently (Sonnemans, & Frijda, 1995), emotion psy-
chologists have rarely focussed on intensity. Most appraisal research has
tended to combine onset and intensity by using scales starting (explicitly
or implicitly) with 0 and ending with an upper scale value for intensity (as
we have done in this study). However, the decomposition of the two aspects
performed in the present analysis clearly shows that it may be necessary
to postulate different appraisal mechanisms for the elicitation or onset of
a specific emotion and for the ensuing intensity. As shown in the present
data, for anger the predicted appraisal profile explains only onset, for good
humor only intensity. This might be partly linked to the issue of whether
the reported emotion is part of the initial reaction or is already part of the
regulation or control reaction (see above). In any case, it would seem that
appraisal theory might benefit from both conceptual and empirical atten-
tion to the issue of predicting onset vs. intensity.
Most importantly, appraisal theories need to evolve from a state of
dealing only with a limited number of "pure" emotions to being able to
predict more complex patterns of emotion mixtures or blends. Given that
the number of cases in which "pure" emotions are reported as a reaction
to a standard naturalistic situation is rather low (see above), the application
domain of such theorizing would seem rather limited. In addition, appraisal
theory may need to address the issue of regulation (which could lead, as
argued above, in part to the reporting of blends) more directly than has
been the case to date (see Parkinson, 1996, 1997).
In general, appraisal theory needs to overcome its dependence on a
standard research paradigm.4 In the case of many appraisal theories the
standard paradigm consists of requesting the recall of prototypical situ-
ations by means of "pure" emotion labels (see introduction). Obviously,
this paradigm privileges the recall of emotional events that have elicited a
relatively pure emotional experience. A phenomenon-based rather than a
paradigm-driven approach (see Scherer, 1992) is likely to correct possible
4By paradigm, in this case, we mean a standard research operation or manipulation used
consistently in a particular research tradition (the "insufficient justification" paradigm in dis-
sonance research being a famous example).
Lost Luggage Emotions 231
biases in either the development or the testing of theories. In consequence,
it seems highly desirable to study emotion-antecedent appraisal processes
increasingly in the context of naturalistic situations.
Emotional Change Following Reappraisal. Only a very modest and pre-
liminary evaluation of the process of emotion was possible in the situation
studied here (with the added complication that both the pre- and the post-
interaction measures of subjective feeling state had to be obtained in the
course of one interview). In spite of these limitations, the results indicate
the utility of studying emotional change over time. Studies with better con-
trol of the timing of the assessment and measurement of intervening re-
appraisal processes are likely to provide important insights into the dynamic
nature of the appraisal process. Of particular interest is the effect an initial
emotional reaction may have on further appraisal and reappraisal. It seems
possible that appraisal biases having produced specific emotional states may
be consolidated by the nature of the emotional reaction, in the sense that
the affect state further encourages biased appraisal (see Keltner, Ellsworth,
& Edwards, 1993). An example for such vicious circles is fear produced by
event appraisal affected by paranoid thinking which may encourage further
unrealistic appraisal. With respect to this possibility, it is interesting to see
the perseverance of anger in the participants studied here. The present
data also produced some evidence that the emotional change can be at-
tributed to the appraisal of new information, in this case the perceived
effcacy of the retrieval service.
In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated the feasibility of
studying a rather standardised emotion-eliciting situation in a naturalistic
context. The promise of this approach to study emotion-antecedent ap-
praisal in ecologically valid settings seems obvious. As briefly mentioned
above, the mere fact of having to adopt an approach directly based on the
phenomenon under investigation, rather than relying on a standard re-
search paradigm, widens the perspective for both theorising and research
and provides the necessary corrective against the self-insulation tendencies
that all theory-driven research is prone to exhibit.
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